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Abstract
This review provides a critical appraisal of Kubow and Min’s paper. It teases out their conception
of liberalism and argues that the classical notion of liberalism as a political theory that advocates individual liberty based on assumptions of the unencumbered autonomous individual has lost currency.
This is because over the years liberalism has mutated into a multiplicity of new forms, and there is no
single view that can be said to define what it means to be a liberal. The paper raises methodological
questions with respect to the use of focus group interviews. It implores researchers to first ask themselves whether they can tell what a person really believes on the basis of a few questions put to him in
an interview.

This article is in response to
Kubow, P. K. & Min, M. (2016). The Cultural Contours of Democracy: Indigenous Epistemologies
Informing South African Citizenship. Democracy and Education, 24(2), Article 5. Available at: http://
democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol24/iss2/5

T

his paper serves as a review article of Kubow and
Min’s (2016) paper, “The Cultural Contours of
Democracy: Indigenous Epistemologies Informing
South African Citizenship.” Kubow and Min examined the
epistemic orientations toward individual-society relations that
inform democratic citizenship and identity in South Africa. They
drew on the concept of Ubuntu as their main theoretical lens to
“examine the ways in which South African schoolteachers in a
township outside Cape Town’s city center view democracy and the
role of formal schools in educating for democracy” (Kubow & Min,
2016, p. 1). Kubow and Min argued that the “public-private epistemological binary stems from a liberal tradition that envisions
society as affording individuals opportunities to fulfil their goals
through individual freedom, property ownership, and privatization
with minimal governmental interference” (Kubow & Min, 2016, p. 2).
The link among Ubuntu, education, liberalism, democracy, and
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 1

citizenship in South Africa cannot be overemphasized (Enslin &
Horsthemke, 2004; Nkondo, 2007; Waghid & Davids, 2014; Waghid
& Smeyers, 2012). South Africa has only recently just emerged from
a sordid history of apartheid, which was marked by an ideology of
racial discrimination, segregation, institutionalized privileging
of the minority White populations, and institutionalized exclusion
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of the majority African peoples from all forms of opportunity.
In 1996 South Africa adopted a constitution that has been hailed
worldwide as “a model liberal democratic constitution that has few
peers in the world community” (Jordan, 1996) and that bears “the
hallmarks of liberal democracy” (Dugard, 1998, p. 23; Enslin &
Horsthemke, 2004, p. 552). Moreover, the constitution “is widely
hailed as liberal and egalitarian” (Deveaux, 2003, p. 162) because
“it values human dignity and frames human rights at its heart”
(Robinson, 2012, p. 2).
In this review article, I provide a critical appraisal of Kubow
and Min’s (2016) paper. I start with an appraisal of Kubow and
Min’s contribution to the debate on Ubuntu. But I also highlight
absence of the literature that has defined the contours of scholarship in Ubuntu and added to our understanding of the concept
(Keevy, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Letseka, 2000; Louw, 2001, 2006;
Mokgoro, 1998; Ramose, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Teffo, 1994; Waghid,
2014a, 2014b; Waghid & Davids, 2014; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012).
Second, I tease out Kubow and Min’s conception of liberalism,
which, I argue, is premised on classical notions of liberalism that
view the individual as an unencumbered autonomous self. I shall
argue that this view of liberalism has lost currency. Over the years,
mainly due to the unintended consequences of colonialism and
imperialism, liberalism has mutated into new forms such that there
is no single view that can be said to define what it means to be a
liberal. Rather, there are “many liberalisms” (Rawls, 1996, p. 223),
“a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000, p. 627), and “a family of
liberalisms” (Simhony, 2003, p. 283). Lumumba-Kasongo (2005)
argued that liberalism “is not the monopoly of Western society as
struggles outside the West have shaped its content and contributed
to its redefinition” (p. 7). Third, I touch on Kubow and Min’s
research methodology. I shall argue that there is a taken-for-
granted assumption that data derived from focus group interviews
is valid and/or conclusive and that there is therefore no need for
any further methodological justifications. But as Kidd & Parshall
(2000) cautioned, “individuals in groups do not speak or answer
questions in the same way that they do in other settings” (p. 294).
In the same vein, Merton (1987) pointed out that focus-group
research gets misused for quick-and-easy claims about the validity
of the research while treating plausible interpretations deriving
from qualitative group interviews “as though they had been shown
to be reliably valid for gauging the distributions of response” (p. 557).
In the fourth and final section, I provide concluding remarks.

Appraisal of Kubow and Min’s Paper
In this section I offer a brief appraisal of Kubow and Min’s (2016)
paper. I shall highlight areas in their contribution to the debate on
Ubuntu that I think are commendable. For instance, their acknowledgement of Ubuntu’s feature of African communal interdependence, as well as their rich and detailed use of verbatim expressions
of their interview respondents. But I shall also show that their
paper has serious shortcomings that warrant critical responses. To
start with, Kubow and Min’s contribution to the debate on Ubuntu
in South Africa is timely and welcome. South Africans continue to
grapple with the challenges of a new and emergent society that was
forged through a tense and protracted process of political
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negotiations by diverse parties that were, at the time at war with
each other. On the one hand, to the majority of the historically
marginalized African peoples, the negotiation process, known at
the time as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA) held hope for the creation of a new nation that would
be marked by non-racism, non-discrimination, and non-sexism.
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu called this new nation the
Rainbow Nation. Herman (2011) wrote that the notion of Rainbow
Nation envisioned a new nation marked by “peace, harmony and
the co-existence of all citizens” (p. 1). On the other hand, to the
historically privileged White minority populations, especially the
Afrikaners, CODESA symbolized political, cultural, and economic
capitulation and doom. The negotiations marked capitulation by
the then ruling Afrikaner Nationalist Party to Black radical
liberation struggle movements that were feared and perceived as
communists and swart gevaar (Afrikaans word for “Black danger”). The liberation struggle movements that fought for the
eradication of apartheid—the African National Congress (ANC),
the Pan African Congress (PAC), the South African Communist
Party (SACP), the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO), and
the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), to mention a few—
were all lumped together by the minority Afrikaners as terrorist
and communist organizations. This was not unusual, given that
apartheid ideology was anti-Black and anti-communist. Indeed, in
1950 the then apartheid regime passed the Suppression of
Communism Act. The act outlawed “the Communist Party and
used a very broad definition of communism (any attempt ‘at
bringing about political, industrial, social or economic change
within the union by promotion of disturbance or disorder’) and to
declare other organizations that opposed government policies
unlawful” (Durkheim, Mtose, & Brown, 2011, p. 5). Thus, to most
Afrikaners, CODESA represented the Afrikaner National Party’s
capitulation to terrorist and communist organizations.
Post-apartheid South Africa has been described as a “Two
Nations” (Mbeki, 1998). On the one hand is the majority Africans,
who are underprivileged and poor and live under conditions of a
grossly underdeveloped economy. This section of society hoped
that CODESA would give birth to a new and better nation in which
peoples’ fundamental human rights and freedoms would be
enshrined in a constitution that strives for a non-racist, non-
discriminative, and non-sexist society. On the other hand is the
minority Whites, who had access to a developed economy and
enjoyed relative prosperity. This section of society feared that the
country would slide into a bloodbath orchestrated by perceived
ruthless terrorists and communists who would only be delighted to
erode all forms of White privilege. During the hearings of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chairperson of the commission, implored
all those who came to testify to embrace the philosophy of Ubuntu,
which is grounded on forgiveness and respect for human dignity.
In his book, No Future without Forgiveness, Tutu (1999) wrote:
A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of
others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or
she has proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she
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belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated
or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if
they were less than who they are. (p. 35)

This brief exposition is necessary in that it links Ubuntu in
South Africa with proceedings of the TRC. To their credit, Kubow
and Min (2016) acknowledged this in their reference to Bishop
Tutu’s assertion that “an individual is not simply an independent,
solitary entity in the African worldview, but ‘human precisely in
being enveloped in [the] community of other human beings,
in being caught up in the bundle of life’” (p. 2). They wrote that
Ubuntu signifies a process or state of perpetual becoming, and that
it denotes a being that is in a continuous process of becoming.
Kubow and Min equated Ubuntu with humanity or humanness, as
captured in the Nguni proverb umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, whose
English translation approximates “a person is a person through
other persons.” Thus, for Kubow and Min, individuals are not
created by or from themselves, nor do they exist for their own
selves. Rather, men and women come from and exist within a social
network—a community. This view confirms a crucial aspect of
Ubuntu, namely the notion of African communal interdependence.
African communal interdependence finds expression in the African
conception of the family, as the extended family, and can be found
in the writings of several African scholars and philosophers in
Southern and Eastern Africa. For instance, Kenyan theologian and
philosopher John S. Mbiti, who is regarded by many as one of the
pioneers of African philosophy, coined the maxim “I am, because
we are; and since we are, therefore I am.” Verhoef and Michel (1997)
argued that the “we” of the African ethos “is a shared experience,
a body of collective experience, an understanding that one’s
experiences are never entirely one’s own” (p. 396). In his seminal
book, African Religions and Philosophy, Mbiti (1989) posited that in
Africa, “the individual cannot exist alone except corporately. She
owes her existence to other people, including those of past generations and her contemporaries” (p. 106). Concomitantly, “whatever
happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual”
(Mbiti, 1989, p. 106). In the same vein, commenting on the Kikuyu
peoples’ way of life, former Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta (1965)
wrote that “according to Kikuyu ways of thinking, nobody is an
isolated individual. Rather, their uniqueness is a secondary fact
about them; first and foremost they are several people’s relatives
and several people’s contemporaries. People are closely interconnected with one another in a lifestyle oriented to the other” (p. 296).
Regarding the family Lauras-Lecoh (1990) contended that
“worldwide Africa is seen as one of the sanctuaries of the extended
family. It is the continent where the nuclear family, reduced to a
couple and their offspring, is still a rarity” (p. 480). For Ayisi (1992,
p.16), the extended family forms the raison d’être of all social
cooperation and responsibility. Mbiti’s (1975, p. 176) view is that the
extended family is a microcosm of the wider society. It embodies a
broad spectrum of personal associations among great-
grandparents, grandparents, fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts,
children (sisters, brothers, cousins, nephews, and nieces), a host of
maternal and paternal relatives, as well as the departed members.
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For Gyekye (1997), “one outstanding cultural value of the traditional African society that is a feature of ever-present consciousness
of ties of kinship is the emphasis on the importance of the family—
the extended family” (pp. 292–293). Thus, in African cultures, the
extended family can be regarded as the medium for the concrete
and spontaneous expression of communal values such as love,
caring, cohesion, solidarity, interdependence, mutual sympathy,
responsibility, and helpfulness.
One of the shortcomings of Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper is
the absence of key role players in the discourse of Ubuntu.
However hard and repeatedly I read through the paper, I couldn’t
help noticing that there is no reference to some of the most
influential scholars on Ubuntu in Southern Africa. These are
scholars who have defined the contours of scholarship on Ubuntu
and contributed to our understanding of debates on the concept
(Keevy, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Louw, 2001, 2006; Mokgoro, 1998;
Ramose, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Teffo, 1994; Waghid, 2014a, 2014b;
Waghid & Davids, 2014; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012). If I were to
single out a few from the above list, it would no doubt be Ramose’s
(1999) book African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Teffo’s (1994) The
Concept of Ubuntu as a Cohesive Moral Value, and Waghid’s (2014)
African Philosophy of Education Reconsidered: On Being Human.
These are some of the landmark works on Ubuntu that anyone
writing about the concept can ill afford to omit from the literature.
Finally, there is a sense that Kubow and Min’s (2016) take on
Ubuntu might be viewed as reductionist in that it appears to
reduce Ubuntu to a South African context instead of viewing it as
an ancient African worldview. Ubuntu has a much wider import to
Southern and East Africa than Kubow and Min made it out to
look. For instance, among the Bantu language speakers of Southern Africa, from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South
Africa, Swaziland, to Zambia and Zimbabwe, Ubuntu is variously
referred. As Tambulasi & Kayuni (2005, p. 148) pointed out, in the
Chewa language of Zambia, Ubuntu is known as Umunthu; among
the Yao speakers of Malawi, it is known as Umundu; among the
Tsonga peoples in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and
Swaziland, it is known as Bunhu; among the Shona-speaking
peoples of Zimbabwe, it is Unhu; among the Sotho-speaking
peoples of Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa, Ubuntu it is
known as Botho; and among the Venda speakers of South Africa, it
is known as Vhutu. Among the Nguni-speaking peoples of South
Africa—Xhosas, Zulus, Ndebeles, and Ngwanes—it is known as
Ubuntu, while among the Swazis of Swaziland, it is known as
Buntfu.

Kubow and Min’s Views on Liberalism
I should hasten to mention that Kubow and Min (2016) only
mentioned the word liberal once in their paper. Nonetheless, that
single occasion is crucial in that it speaks to perceptions of creation
of citizens (Callan, 1997). Kubow and Min drew on Cohen’s (1982)
book Four Systems to argue that
in the West, the concept of citizen is associated with the public realm
and the individual with that of the private sphere. This public-private
epistemological binary stems from a liberal tradition that envisions
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society as affording individuals opportunities to fulfill their goals
through individual freedom, property ownership, and privatization
with minimal governmental interference. (Kubow & Min, 2016, p. 2)

However, this view of liberalism as purely individualist and
unencumbered is outdated in that it ignores the simple fact that
due to colonial conquest and the spectra of imperialism the notion
of liberalism has mutated and undergone transformation and
indigenization. As a result, it is no longer plausible to speak of
liberalism as if the concept has been frozen in time and space to
retain its classical Western connotations. As Ware (1992) reminded
us, “the ‘exporting’ of liberal democracy to ex-colonies or to
regimes which were conquered militarily, but which had no
previous history of liberal democracy (such as Japan), transforms
liberal democracy” (p. 140). It is Ware’s (1992) contention that
“there are today quite distinct types of liberal democracy” (p. 137).
The literature shows that a country like Japan is a useful example of
a non-Western liberal democracy that has successfully imported
external Western cultures and indigenized them to suit the needs
and aspirations of the Japanese people (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1993, 1996). Commenting on the specific case of South Africa,
Enslin (1999) pointed out that “the new democratic order in South
Africa and its education system presuppose some central distinguishing features of liberalism” (p. 175). It is therefore unsurprising
that some contemporary liberal theorists now acknowledge that
there exists “a family of liberalisms” (Simhony, 2003, p. 283),
“a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000, p. 627), and “many
liberalisms” (Rawls, 1996, p. 223).
An Ubuntu-oriented view of liberalism would therefore be
one that recognizes individual rights, but within the framework
and guiding principles of a community. There is tacit knowledge among some liberal theorists that “liberalism is itself a
form of community” (Galston, 1991, p. 43), in which members
“excel in liberal virtues and as a consequence, flourish in a
distinctively liberal way” (Macedo, 1991, p. 278). Other liberal
theorists have suggested that “liberalism supplies the best
interpretation of a political community” (Dworkin, 1989, p.
480); that “the lives of individual people and that of their
community are integrated” (Dworkin, 1989 p. 491); and that
“the critical success of any one of their lives is an aspect of, and
so is dependent on the goodness of the community as a whole”
(Dworkin, 1989 p. 491). Thus, “the inseparability of rights and
community is a consistent liberal position” (Simhony, 2003,
p. 271). Abbey and Taylor (1996, p. 3) contended that “it is
possible for someone to have communitarian or holist ontology
and to value liberalism’s individual rights.” In my view, Mulhall
(1987) was spot-on in his observation that the liberal “need have
no difficulty in accepting the constitutive role of community
membership” (p. 275). He argued that “liberals must indeed
affirm that the political community’s institutions embody a
vision relating to personhood, that is, they must affirm that such
institutions protect that capacity which makes an individual
citizen a human agent and so refer to a capacity which every
citizen is supposed to possess if he is to be seen as a person at
all” (Mulhall, 1987, p. 275).
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Kubow and Min’s Research
Methodological Shortcoming
Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper is based on a qualitative study
involving focus group interviews of 50 Xhosa teachers at 7 primary
and intermediate schools on the outskirts of Cape Town in the
Western Cape Province, South Africa. In total, their sample
comprised 34 females and 16 males. Kubow and Min told us:
The lead author conducted focus group interviews at the schools,
which ranged in length from 45 to 75 minutes. The interviews were
audio recorded and then transcribed verbatim. The resultant
empirical data, combined with a review of scholarship regarding
ubuntu and democracy, constitute the main sources of evidence for
this case study. (2016, p. 5)

Kubow and Min explained that the participants comprised a
mixed bag of relatively inexperienced (two months) teachers to
highly seasoned teachers with 30 years of teaching experience.
When Kubow and Min’s sample is disaggregated by age, the
participants’ ages ranged between 20 and 69 years. There seems to
be an implicit presumption in Kubow and Min’s paper that merely
stating that “focus group interviews with 50 Xhosa teachers from
all seven primary and intermediate schools” (Kubow and Min,
2014, p. 3) were conducted is sufficient justification of the reliability of the data obtained, and by extension sufficient justification
for the inferences thereof which the authors made. Hammersley
(2003) called this “the ‘romantic impulse’ which treats open-
ended interviews as capturing the ‘genuine voices’ of interviewees” (p. 119). In the 1950s, Dean and Whyte (1958) asked a simple
question: “How do you know if the informant is telling the truth?”
They noted that “those who ask the question seem bothered by the
insight that people sometimes say things for public consumption
that they would not say in private. And sometimes they behave in
ways that seem to contradict or cast serious doubt on what they
profess in open conversation. So the problem arises: Can you tell
what a person really believes on the basis of a few questions put to
him in an interview” (p. 34)? Crucially, Dean & Whyte cautioned
that “the informant’s statement represents merely the perception
of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive and
emotional reactions and reported through his personal verbal
usages” (Dean & Whyte, 1958, p. 34). From this analysis, they
argued that the interview merely yields “the informant’s picture of
the world as he sees it. And we are getting it only as he is willing to
pass it on to us in this particular interview situation” (Dean &
Whyte, 1958, p. 34).
Lunt (1996) warned that the decisions and rationale behind
the use of interviews “often remain implicit with the research
presenting the findings as if no choices had been made beyond that
of using focus groups in the first place” (p. 80). In the case of
Kubow and Min’s paper, their data is further complicated by the
seeming imbalance between female and male respondents. For
instance, the fact that female respondents (34) are more than
double the number of male respondents (16) is neither problematized nor unpacked further. Instead, it is taken as a given or a
self-explanatory research methodological phenomenon. It is a
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serious methodological flaw on Kubow and Min’s part that the
potential for their data to statistically privilege female voices over
male voices in the articulation of the cultural contours of democracy is neither unpacked nor probed. Finally, the question whether
interviewing 50 teachers in a township with a population of 50,000
is representative justification of “the cultural contours of democracy” in that township is left to the reader’s imagination. In cases
like these, a footnote declaring that the findings of the study should
not be regarded as sufficient to generalize on the nexus between
Ubuntu and democratic citizenship in Cape Town in particular,
and in South Africa in general, would have sufficed.

Conclusion
What I have attempted to in this review article is to provide a
critical appraisal of Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper “The Cultural
Contours of Democracy: Indigenous Epistemologies Informing
South African Citizenship.” I acknowledged the value-added
contribution of Kubow and Min’s paper to the debate on Ubuntu
and education for democratic citizenship in South Africa. I
showed that South Africa has only just emerged from a sordid
history of racial discrimination, segregation, institutionalized
privileging of the minority White populations, and systematic
exclusion of the majority of the African peoples from all forms of
opportunity. Post-apartheid South Africa is still grappling with
the challenges of managing the gains of the 1994 democratic
processes that were forged through political negotiations between
opposition parties that were at war with each other. Attaining
democratic citizenship in this fragile sociopolitical and cultural
environment requires a new mindset that is imbued with Ubuntu
moral values and principles. I commended Kubow and Min’s
paper as a timely and welcome contribution to the debate on
Ubuntu. But I also demarcated the paper’s weaknesses, which I
argued call for critical responses. For instance, I showed that the
paper is thin on the important literature that defined the contours
of scholarship on Ubuntu and contributed to our understanding
of the concept. Methodologically, I highlighted Kubow and Min’s
uncritical dependence on focus group interviews. I pointed out
that during interviews, informants’ statements merely represent
their perceptions, which are filtered and modified by the informants’ cognitive and emotional reactions and reported through
their personal verbal usages. I raised questions of validity in terms
of whether statements made by 50 teachers during focus group
interviews can be regarded as representative of views of 50,000
residents of the township in which the study was conducted. I
suggested this could have simply been remedied by a footnote
declaring that the findings of the study should not be regarded as
generalizable.
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